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Abstract 
Turski, W.M., Prescribing behaviors, Theoretical Computer Science 90 (1991) 119-125. 
This paper argues that prescribing a behaviour is different from programming a process, and 
presents a possible formalism for the former together with some examples. 
Computer programs are written for a great many different purposes. Traditional 
programs, a progeny of numeric computations and ledger updating, prescribe 
processes. In this note we shall consider programs which prescribe behaviours. 
“Behaviour”, just as “process”, is not a fully technical term. Fortunately, their 
precise definitions shall not be required; if anything, we shall rely on their differences. 
At the risk of appearing utterly naive, we start with two entirely informal examples 
of instructions a mother may give to her daughter. 
Instruction 1. How to make a sandwich. Take a loaf of bread. Cut two slices from 
it. Spread butter evenly on one side of each. Put a slice of ham on one buttered 
slice of bread. Put a wedge of cheese on the other. Add some lettuce or sliced 
tomatoes. Fold the two pieces together, if too squirmy, fasten with a toothpick. 
Instruction 2. What to do in the afternoon. You may watch TV. If you get hungry 
make yourself a sandwich. When it gets dark switch on the lights. If you feel cold 
put on the red jumper. When your father calls tell him I went out shopping and 
should be back by supper time. 
Instruction 1 prescribes a process, Instruction 2 prescribes a behaviour. Both 
kinds of instructions are very frequent in our lives, but only the first kind developed 
into computer programs. Of course, there are good historical reasons for this: all 
sorts of clever arrangements for “hand calculations” and commercial book-keeping 
were of this kind; the development followed rather naturally. 
It is less clear why the theoretical work has largely ignored the second kind of 
instruction. One can, perhaps, understand why a Turing machine models a computa- 
tional process. It is much harder to appreciate why all (theoretic) automata are built 
on the same principle. 
What are the essential differences between the two kinds of instruction? 
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Any process-instruction is intrinsically sequential. Note that its sequentiality is 
not merely a matter of the write-up, it cannot be separated from the “physics” of 
the process: one cannot detect the need (or otherwise) for a toothpick before the 
pieces are folded together. 
A behaviour-instruction has no intrinsic sequentiality in it (apart from local 
sequentiality in executing individual actions, such as making a sandwich). 
For a process, there is a well-defined initial state (explicit or implicit, does not 
matter), a progression of steps, each bringing an overall goal a little closer, and, 
hopefully, a final step in which the goal is achieved. Actions that constitute the 
process are expected to be executed in a state established by their predecessor (with 
the trivial exception of the initial action). 
There is no clear initial state for a behaviour, nor an overall goal-like purpose to 
the collection of actions. No action is expected to happen unless its “guarding” 
condition is established, but individual actions need not be responsible for establish- 
ing the conditions propitious for other actions. The individual actions are in fact 
reactions to certain conditions that may have arisen, rather than steps aimed at 
establishing conditions for possible future actions. 
Deep in the understanding of a process is an assumption of insulation. There is 
no environment to interfere with the process (no cat to steal a piece of ham). In 
subsequent developments this implicit assumption of splendid isolation of processes 
has been somewhat relaxed when I/O instructions and interrupts were grudgingly 
added to programming concepts (always as second class citizens!), but the idea that 
the program controls interactions with the environment is still dominant. 
A behaviour is defined in terms of reactions to the “current” environment. The 
guarding conditions are evaluated in states which are not assumed to be the results 
of the “past” behaviour. Indeed, the analysis of the “historical trace” hardly ever 
helps in the analysis of “current” behaviour, the “past” need not influence the 
“present” at all: the little girl may get hungry regardless of whether she has put the 
red jumper on or not. (On the other hand, the analysis of the collection of past 
events, i.e. associations of conditions with reactions, may be very helpful; it is the 
sequence of past events that is largely irrelevant and may be misleading). 
In terms to which we are accustomed, the meaning of a processual instruction 
depends on the transitivity of action composition. Hence the programmers’ concern 
with issues of termination; hence also the essentially transformational flavour of all 
formal semantics of programs. A correct program computes the right final output 
for any acceptable input. 
For a behavioural instruction the compositionality of actions is of no concern. 
There is no global transformation to be performed by transitively composing 
individual actions. Termination (apart, possibly, from a simplifying assumption of 
each individual action itself terminating) is of no concern, either. Correctness of 
behavioural programs depends on two questions: 
l are the condition/action associations appropriate? (“When hungry, switch on 
TV” would, apparently, provide an example of an inappropriate association!), and 
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l are all possible contingencies covered by the guarding conditions? (e.g., the little 
girl was not instructed what to do when she feels thirsty). 
Programming for processes has been keenly developed for the last 50 year or so. 
The results are commensurate with the effort put into development. We have a 
sound theory (or two) of such programs, we have a number of excellent programming 
methods (“methodologies”), we have accumulated a large body of practical 
experience and, indeed, some very reasonable tools (languages, compilers etc.). 
Unfortunately, the applications of computers, especially in such areas as process 
control (sic!), telecommunication, data bases, and interactive services, do not really 
belong to the process class. Attempts to apply the armory of process-programming 
to problems which call for behaviour-programming are not entirely satisfactory. At 
the moment our methodological work seems to be directed towards new tools of 
process-programming capable of handling problems posed by the new kinds of 
computer applications. If the distinction between processes and behaviours is as 
deep as this author believes it to be, then perhaps much of this work is misdirected. 
In addition, it appears that the acceptance of the process view of behaviours forces 
the programmers to consider questions which would be totally irrelevant (and thus 
would not arise) if the behaviour view was accepted. 
Consider an example of a simple vending maching. This machine has a finite 
magazine containing chocolates and a slot through which coins can be pushed in. 
It also has an externally accessible bay from which a chocolate can be picked up, 
a box for coins accepted in payment, and a drawer for coins to be returned. 
In order to prescribe the behaviour of the vending machine, we introduce several 
boolean variables (in a more general case we would probably introduce predicates): 
RC e the machine is ready to accept a coin, 
CS H there is a coin in the slot, 
CP e a customer has paid up but no chocolate has been yet 
put for him into the dispensing bay, 
CA @ the magazine contains at least one chocolate, 
and an integer counter, cc, of chocolates in the magazine. We also assume the 
availability of three special “primitive operations”: 
accept-coin: defined when there is a coin in the slot; on completion of 
this operation the coin is no longer in the slot (presumably 
it has been dropped into the box), 
reject-coin: defined when there is a coin in the slot; on completion of this 
operation the coin is no longer in the slot (presumably it has 
been dropped into the return drawer), 
dispense-chocolate: defined when the magazine is not empty; on comple- 
tion of this operation a chocolate from the magazine 
is put into the externally accessibly bay. 
122 W. M. Tut-ski 
The vending machine behaviour may be now prescribed as follows: 
{ RC, CS, CP, CA, cc := true, false, false, N 2 1, N} 
CS A RC -+ accept-coin ; RC := false ; CP := true 
IICSA - RC + reject-coin 
11 CP A CA + dispense_chocolate 
; cc, CP := cc - 1, false 
; if cc = 0 then CA:= false else RC := true fi 
IICPA - CA + reject-coin; CP := false 
II-(CPv CS)+skip 
where the multiple assignment in braces denotes the initialization of variables, and 
N is the number of chocolates put into the magazine. The main body of the behaviour 
program consists of five guarded actions separated by )I symbols. Each guarded 
action consists of a boolean expression (the guard), followed by the + symbol, and 
by an action program. Action programs are written here in a familiarly vague fashion; 
it is assumed that action programs terminate when initiated in states in which the 
corresponding guards are satisfied. Operational semantics of such a behaviour 
program is given by requesting that whenever there obtains a state in which a guard 
is satisfied, the corresponding action program is executed. 
Note that no sequence of the vending machine actions is ever mentioned. We 
never say (nor need to) what the machine does first, and what it does next. We do 
not even say that the machine with no coin in the slot and no paid-up customer 
waits for some external event to change its state. The behaviour program merely 
prescribes that the vending machine by itself does not change its state in which 
there is no paid-up customer nor a coin in the slot. In any other state, however 
obtained, the program prescribes a state-changing action. 
For instance, whenever there is a coin in the slot and the machine is not ready 
to accept it, the coin is rejected. In “normal” operation of the vending machine the 
“not ready to accept a coin” attribute of the state is established by the action 
associated with guard CS A RC, but any environmental interference which sets RC 
to false (such as, e.g., hitting the “suspend trading” button by the maintenance 
engineer) also establishes the condition under which a coin from the slot will be 
rejected. 
A behaviour program is nondeterministic in the sense that if several guards are 
satisfied simultaneously, the choice of action to perform (from the set of currently 
enabled ones) is random. In the vending machine example, the guards form three 
groups: 
CS-group: CS A CA, CS A - RC 
CP-group: CP A CA, CP A -CA 
X-group: -( CP v CS) 
In the space of four boolean variables (CA, CS, CP, RC), the X-group complements 
the union of the other two groups. Thus in any state in this space the machine either 
skips (its state is in X-group) or performs a state-changing action (its state is in the 
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union); this distinction does not involve any choice. However, if the current state 
belongs to the union of CS and CP groups, a choice of actions may be possible, 
indeed it has to be made in states where CS A CP holds, which corresponds to 
situations arising, e.g., when a second coin is pushed into the slot before the 
previously paid-for chocolate has been dispensed or the previously pushed in coin 
rejected; whether this is physically possible, or not, depends on the mechanical 
design of the vending machine. 
Because the environment can change the state of the vending machine while the 
latter is performing an action (e.g., coins may be pushed in very rapidly), we must 
refine the way in which behaviour programs are constructed and interpreted. The 
guards-as we understood them so far-described situations in which corresponding 
actions were allowed to happen; let us call them preguards. In order to handle the 
state changes occurring during the performance of an action but not caused by it, 
we introduce two assumptions (introduce two restrictions on admissible semantics): 
(1) Actions are performed on a private copy of the state. This copy is (atomically) 
taken from the global (public) state in which the preguard is satisfied and the action 
is chosen for execution. (If, despite the preguard’s satisfaction, the action is not 
started, there is no need to make a copy.) 
(2) Each action is associated with a second guard, known as postguard, evaluated 
on the public state at the end of action. If the postguard holds, the results of action 
(atomically) update the public state. If the postguard fails, the private copy modified 
by the action is abandoned, the action has no visible effects. 
Of the two assumptions, the second is less obvious. In particular, one could argue 
that the postguard should be evaluated not on the public state, but on the private 
copy, which would take into account the results of the action just performed. The 
decision to evaluate the postguard on the public state is based on the following 
reasoning. If-while the action was being performed (on a private copy of the 
state)-no changes were made to the public state, the postguard is not really needed, 
assuming, of course, that the action is well designed for the situation in which it 
was initiated. Therefore if there is any doubt as to the appropriateness of the results 
of the action just completed, such doubts could be only due to these changes in the 
environment which took place while the action was being performed. These changes 
could not possibly be due to the action itself, as it was performed on a private copy 
of the state. Hence, the postguard evaluation on the public state corresponds to 
asking the question “Are the results of this action still needed in the new situation?” 
If the answer is positive, the results are made public, otherwise they are simply 
discarded. 
The notation for pre- and postguarded actions is quite simple: 
(P, Q)+p 
denotes action p with preguard P and postguard Q. 
Examples. (1) If we want to prescribe an action p that takes place in a situation 
where P holds, and whose results are acceptable regardless of any environmental 
124 W. M. Turski 
changes that may happen while it is being performed, we write 
(P, true) + p. 
(2) If we want to prescribe an action p which can be initiated between 9: 30 and 
9: 45, and should be completed before 10: 15, otherwise we prefer not to do it at 
all, we write (with t standing for time measured in decimal fractions) 
(9.5~ tG9.75, t<10.25)+p. 
Note that if p in this example involves an assignment to t, as in 
(9.5 S t G 9.75, t < 10.25) + serve-coffee; t := 10.5, 
its new value will become public only if the entire action (serve-coffee; t:= 10.5) 
initiated between 9 : 30 and 9 : 45 can be completed before 10 : 15 on the public clock, 
in which case the coffee is served and public time is advanced to 10 : 30. If serving 
the coffee takes too long, it is not served and the time remains as it was (i.e. is 
determined by the environment). 
(3) If we want to prescribe an action p having two conditions, P to start and Q 
to be acceptable, we may delay checking of Q by making it into the postguard. A 
particularly interesting case arises when Q- - P, i.e. 
(P, -P)+p 
which prescribes an action p which has a public effect only if during its execution 
the environment changes the public state to the “opposite” of what it was at the 
start of this action. 
This principle can be applied to the design of a simple event counter. Assume 
the event of interest consists of a public variable x changing its value from 0 to 1, 
or from 1 to 0. 
Then 
(x=O,x=l)+n:=n+l 
I\(x=l,x=O)+n:=n+l 
prescribes the behaviour of the desired counter, n. 
An objection could be raised that if the event is more rapid than execution of 
n := n + 1, then the counter may miss some events. This objection is, unfortunately, 
well-founded. On the other hand, the same criticism applies to any design of a 
discrete counter which does not control the event, as only “counters” interfering 
with the event (via some synchronizing mechanism), can be certain not to miss an 
arbitrarily rapid event. Incidentally, this form of Heisenberg’s principle is often 
overlooked in designs of process control software. 
The pre- and postguarded constructs introduced in this paper as a notational 
device for elementary constituents of behaviour programs have also been applied 
to specifications of control problems [I] without time, and to specifications of 
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multiprocessor computing [2]. Whether or not such reusability of notation reflects 
any deeper kinship of these problems, the coincidence is intriguing. 
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